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Moultrie v. State, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 93 (Dec. 24, 2015)1 
CRIMINAL LAW: JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN FILING AN INFORMATION BY 
AFFIDAVIT   
Summary 
 
 The Court of Appeals determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion by 
allowing the State to file an information by affidavit more than 15 days after the preliminary 
examination concluded, when the justice court committed an “egregious error,” and “the defendant 
was discharged but not prejudiced by the delay.” Further, the Court defines “egregious error” as 
when “a charge was erroneously dismissed or a defendant was erroneously discharged based on a 
magistrate’s error.” Due to the justice court’s egregious errors in the preliminary examination that 
resulted in appellant’s discharge, the Court found that the district court was not in error by granting 
the State’s motion to file an information by affidavit. The judgment of conviction by the district 




 Deputy Sheriff Matthew Kirkland arrested appellant Matthew Moultrie for drug possession 
with intent to sell. Moultrie was a passenger in a car stopped by Kirkland for a traffic violation. 
The driver of the car orally consented to a search of the car. During the search, Kirkland discovered 
a backpack that contained “fifty dollars, a glass pipe, and a plastic bag holding a crystalline 
substance.” Kirkland believed that this substance was methamphetamine, and that it belonged to 
Moultrie. Moultrie initially claimed that the backpack and items did not belong to him, but 
confessed to ownership of the items and intent to sell them after being advised of his Miranda 
rights. The substance later tested positive for amphetamine.  
 The Justice Court of Esmeralda Township held a preliminary examination, with the State 
calling Kirkland and another deputy as its witnesses. During the examination, Moultrie objected 
on hearsay grounds to Kirkland’s testimony of the driver’s oral consent to search the car. The 
justice court sustained the hearsay objection, as well as Moultrie’s further objection that any 
evidence obtained during the search was “fruit of the poisonous tree.” The justice court allowed 
the hearing to proceed, but ultimately excluded any testimony describing the evidence seized 
during the search.  
 The State charged Moultrie in the criminal complaint with a category C felony but did not 
allege a prior conviction or produce any evidence at the preliminary hearing that demonstrated a 
prior conviction existed. “It is a category C felony if the defendant has a prior conviction and is 
convicted under NRS 453.337(2)(b).” During its rebuttal closing argument, the State made a 
motion to amend the complaint to instead charge Moultrie under NRS 453.337(2)(1), a category 
D felony for first time offenses. The justice court denied the States motion to amend its complaint, 
and discharged Moultrie because the State did not meet the burden of proof for a class C felony.  
 63 days after the justice court discharged Moultrie, the State made a motion for leave to 
file an information by affidavit in the district court, and included a proposed information charging 
Moultrie with the category D felony, asserting “egregious error by the justice court.” Moultrie 
                                                 
1  By Cassandra Ramey 
opposed the motion, stating that it was untimely, filed without good cause for delay, and 
prejudicial. Moultrie further responded that the justice court did not commit an “egregious error” 
and therefore the State had no basis to file an information by affidavit. The district court granted 
the State’s motion 34 days after it was filed, concluding that the State had presented sufficient 
evidence to support a finding of probable cause for a category D felony during the preliminary 
hearing. Further, the district court also concluded that “(1) the State’s delay in filing the motion 
did not prejudice Moultrie, (2) the justice court committed egregious error by sustaining Moultrie’s 
hearsay objection, and (3) the justice court committed egregious error by denying the State’s 
motion to amend the complaint.”  
 Moultrie pleaded guilty as charged but reserved the right to appeal the district court’s order 
granting the State’s motion to file an information. The district court sentenced Moultrie to 19-48 
months in prison, but the court suspended this sentence and placed Moultrie on probation for five 




Timeliness of the motion 
 
 Moultrie contends that the district court erred in permitting the State to file an information 
by affidavit when the State filed its motion 63 days after his discharge by the justice court. The 
Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that “[i]t is within the discretion of the district court to grant a 
motion to file an information by affidavit.”2 Further, the Court stated that in order to establish that 
the district court erred by granting a motion to file an information by affidavit more than 15 days 
after the preliminary examination, “the defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from 
the untimely filing,” 3 and that the prejudice alleged cannot be “hypothetical or speculative.”4 
 Here, the State did not motion for leave of court to file an information by affidavit until 63 
days after the preliminary examination, and district court granted the motion a total of 97 days 
after the preliminary examination. Moultrie alleged that this delay was prejudicial because he was 
unaware that he could be recharged, and so did not consult counsel or pursue any defenses.  
Moultrie failed to show how the lack of preparation was prejudicial to his defense, or how 
the opportunity to consult counsel or establish a defense during the delay would have benefited his 
case. Because of this failure to show prejudice, the district court held and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed that his claim of prejudice was speculative and did not warrant denial of the motion. Thus, 
                                                 
2  NEV. REV. STAT. §173.035(2) (2013) states in part: “If, however, upon the preliminary examination the accused 
has been discharged… the Attorney General when acting pursuant to a specific statute or the district attorney may, 
upon affidavit of any person who has knowledge of the commission of an offense, and who is a competent witness 
to testify in the case…by leave of the court first had, file an information, and process must forthwith be issued 
thereon.” The Court notes that pursuant to NRS 173.035(3) and NRS 173.045, there is a 15-day time limit in which 
to file an information when the defendant has been held to answer. However, if the defendant has been discharged, 
an information by affidavit can only be filed if the State first obtains leave of court. Therefore, when the defendant 
has been discharged the State is in an “untenable position,” because it is impossible for the State to comply with 
NRS 173.035(3) without judicial action. The only deadline the State could meet in this circumstance is the deadline 
to motion for leave to file the information. 
3  See, e.g., Berry v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 93 Nev. 557, 558-59, 571 P.2d 109, 110 (1977); Thompson v. State, 86 
Nev. 682, 683, 475 P.2d 96, 97 (1970). 
4  See Wyman v. State, 125 Nev. 592, 601, 217 P.3d 572, 579 (2009). 
the Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its findings that Moultrie 




 Moultrie also asserted that the district court erred by finding that the justice court 
committed an egregious error in its ruling, and allowing the State to file an information by affidavit 
based upon this error. The Court, reviewing the district court’s determination of egregious error 
de novo, stated: “[a]n information by affidavit may be filed to correct a magistrate’s egregious 
error but not to correct deficiencies in evidence at the preliminary examination.”5 The Nevada 
Supreme Court has long used the term “egregious error,” when discussing the proper time to file 
an information by affidavit, but it has never explicitly defined the term. The Court here takes the 
opportunity to provide a clear definition of the term “egregious error” and its proper applications. 
The Court first examines the purpose of NRS 173.035(2), citing Maes v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty.6, in 
which the Supreme Court held that the statute “provides a safety valve against an arbitrary or 
mistaken decision of the magistrate.”  
 The Nevada Supreme Court has applied the term egregious error “when a charge was 
erroneously dismissed or a defendant was erroneously discharged based on a magistrate’s error.”7 
In each of these cases, the error by the magistrate was a plain error, defined in Patterson v. State 
as an error “so unmistakable that it reveals itself by a casual inspection of the record.”8 Therefore, 
the Court definitively defines a magistrate’s error as egregious “when the magistrate commits plain 
error that affects the outcome of the proceedings.” 
  
Hearsay objection and exclusion of evidence  
 
 The State did not address Moultrie’s claims as to the validity of the search, instead 
responding that the justice courts hearsay ruling in regards to Kirkland’s testimony about the 
driver’s consent to search the car, and the suppression of any evidence relating to the search was 
egregious error, therefore allowing for the filing of an information by affidavit. The district court 
agreed that the justice court erred by sustaining the hearsay objection, preventing the justice court 
from considering admissible evidence when making the probable cause determination. Upon 
review, the district court determined that the evidence excluded by the justice court was sufficient 
to hold Moultrie to answer.  
 The Court here held that the “justice court’s decision to exclude all evidence obtained from 
the search of the backpack as fruit of the poisonous tree was error,” and that in general a motion 
to suppress evidence must be filed to exclude evidence on constitutional grounds.9 The Court found 
further error with the justice court’s hearsay ruling; as the State offered Kirkland’s testimony to 
establish why Kirkland continued with the search of the car. Therefore, Kirkland’s testimony was 
                                                 
5  State v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 114 Nev. 739, 71-42, 964 P.2d (1998). 
6  86 Nev. 317, 319, 468 P.2d 332, 333 (1970). 
7  Cranford v. Smart, 92 Nev. 89, 91, 545 P.2d 1162, 1163 (1976); Feole v. State, 113 Nev.628, 631, 939 P.2d 1061, 
1063 (1997). 
8  111 Nev. 1525, 1530, 907 P.2d 984, 987 (1995).  
9   The Court notes that they are not holding that a motion to suppress evidence must be filed in justice court before a 
constitutional objection is raised during a preliminary examination, but rather that in this case no such motion was 
filed in justice or district court, and “without a motion or suppression hearing the alleged illegal search and seizure 
cannot be a basis to reverse the judgment of the district court.” 
not hearsay because it did not go to the truth of the matter asserted.10 The Court concluded that the 
justice court’s error regarding the hearsay ruling was “plain from a casual inspection of the record 
and resulted in Moultrie’s discharge,” and therefore affirmed the district courts finding that the 
justice court committed egregious error. 
 
Motion to amend the complaint 
 
 The Court also disagrees with Moultrie’s contention that the district court erred in finding 
that the justice court committed egregious error by denying the State’s motion to amend the 
complaint, stating that the error in the complaint of referring to a category C (second offense) 
felony compared with a category D (first-time offense) felony was immaterial in the preliminary 
examination. Because the offered amendment to the complaint would have required Moultrie to 
defend the same underlying crime and Moultrie had sufficient notice of the charges, granting the 
motion would not have affected his substantial rights. Further, “[a] justice court may permit the 
State to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence presented.”11 The State presented 
sufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing to show that Moultrie had committed a first-time 
offense of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell. Because the district court 
was not in error by finding that the justice court committed egregious error by preventing the State 
to amend its complaint, the Court here concludes that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
by granting the motion to file an information by affidavit under NRS 173.035(2).  
 
Conclusion 
 The Court concludes that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 
Moultrie failed to demonstrate actual prejudice “resulting from the delay in filing the motion for 
leave to file an information by affidavit,” and that further, there was no error by the district court 
in finding that the justice court committed egregious error that resulted in Moultrie’s discharge. 
Therefore, there was no abuse in discretion by the district court in granting the State’s motion to 





Tao, J., Concurring 
 
 Judge Tao, concurring with the court dubitante, agrees that the majority opinion addresses 
the only arguments presented in Moultrie’s appeal. However, he is uncertain whether any court 
has the discretion to waive a deadline to file an information by affidavit under the plain language 
of the applicable statutes. The 15 day deadline of NRS 173.035(3) “applies to the filing of any 
information in district court regardless of whether the defendant (a) was held to answer the charges 
and bound over for trial as a result of a preliminary hearing, (b) was bound over to district court 
because he waived his right to a preliminary hearing, or (c) was discharged from custody after all 
                                                 
10  See People v. Nelson, 212 Cal. Rptr. 799, 803 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that oral words of consent are not offered 
to prove the truth of the matter, rather they are relevant as words of authorization; they are therefore nonhearsay).  
11  Viray v. State, 121 Nev. 159, 163, 111 P.3d 1079, 1082 (2005). 
charges were dismissed during the preliminary hearing and the State now seeks to reinstate the 
charges in district court by way of information by affidavit.” 
 The statutory language of NRS 173.035(3) states that the information “must” be filed no 
later than 15 days after the holding or waiver of the preliminary hearing. “When a statute says 
‘must,’ we are required to rigorously interpret that word as meaning that the Legislature intended 
to deprive courts of the discretion to refuse to do what the statute directs.”12 Because “‘must’ means 
‘must,’” an information of any kind cannot be filed more than 15 days following a preliminary 
hearing under NRS 173.035(3)– unless the Legislature chose to give discretion in another 
applicable statute. Here, NRS 178.556 provides some discretion: stating that the district court 
“may” dismiss an information that was not filed before the expiration of the 15-day deadline when 
the defendant was held to answer. The Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted NRS 178.556 to 
mean that a district court has some discretion to permit a late filed information to proceed when a 
defendant has not suffered prejudice, or even if the State cannot show “good cause” for the delay. 
 In this case, the district court interpreted this statute as allowing equal discretion for when 
a defendant was discharged as when the defendant was held to answer. However, NRS 178.556(1) 
states that this discretion applies only when the defendant has been held to answer for the charges. 
Therefore, Judge Tao believes that the question raised by this appeal can be characterized as: 
“whether, notwithstanding the text of NRS 173.035(3) and 178.556, a district court also possesses 
the same, or at least similar, discretion to waive the deadline when the State seeks to fill an 
information by affidavit more than 15 days after a defendant has been discharged….” Interpreting 
this question as “strict constructionists,” of the applicable statutes, the answer is no.  
“Where the Legislature has expressly prohibited the exercise of judicial discretion, we do 
not have the power to create it ourselves except perhaps in the most compelling of circumstances.” 
Here, NRS 173.035(3) limits judicial discretion, except when permitted under NRS 178.556. NRS 
178.556 only allows discretion when a defendant has been called to answer, and states nothing 
about defendants who have already been discharged. Using a “strict constructionist” interpretation, 
the district court does not possess any discretion to permit the filing of an information more than 
15 days after the discharge of a defendant, even if the State had “good cause” and there was little 
prejudice to the defendant. Additionally, Nevada Supreme Court precedent also suggests that a 
district court only has discretion to permit filing an information after the defendant has been called 
to answer.13 There is no existing judicial precedent in Nevada that “contemplates or creates 
discretion to permit the late filing of an information by affidavit more than 15 days after a 
defendant was discharged rather than held to answer the charges.”  
 There is a distinction between filing an information when a defendant has been bound to 
answer, and filing and information when a defendant has already been discharged. The filing of an 
information after the defendant has been bound over occurs as a “ministerial act” after a judicial 
finding that the charges were supported by probable cause. On the contrary, the filing of an 
information after a defendant has been discharged would require a judicial officer overruling 
another judicial officer’s determination that the charges lacked probable cause, or that the State’s 
pleadings were insufficient in some manner that required dismissal. Judge Tao states that it would 
be “utterly illogical for the Legislature to have decided that there ought to be a very tight, 
                                                 
12  NEV. REV. STAT. § 0.025(1)(c) defines “must” as expressing a requirement. See Goudge v. State, 128 Nev. _, _, 
287 P.3d 301, 304 (2012) (“the word ‘shall’ imposes a duty on a party to act and prohibits judicial discretion”); 
Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA, 127 Nev. 462, 467, 255 P.3d 1281, 1285 (2011) (“as it is used here, ‘must’ is a 
synonym of ‘shall.’”) 
13  See Berry, 93 Nev. 557, 571P.2d 109; Thompson, 86 Nev. 682, 472 P. 2d 96. 
nondiscretionary deadline for the State to make this request and thereby force the defendant to 
again face charges that were already dismissed.” 
 Because of this, Judge Tao would interpret NRS 173.035(3) as “creating an absolute 
statutory bar to the filing of an information by affidavit more than 15 days after the defendant has 
been discharged from custody after a preliminary hearing, without any inquiry into the presence 
or absence of either ‘good cause’ or prejudice.”  
 
